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In a financial context, regulation can have two impacts.  
First, it can help to prevent financial failures.  I will call this an 
ex ante, or ‘preventive,’ approach to financial regulation.  Second, 
regulation can help to mitigate the harm from financial failures.  
I will call that an ex post, or ‘mitigative,’ approach to financial 
regulation. 
Some commentators frame an ex ante/ex post regulatory 
distinction around conduct: regulation that targets bad conduct 
before it occurs is deemed ex ante, whereas regulation that 
targets bad conduct after it occurs is deemed ex post.1 
It makes sense to frame the distinction around conduct if one 
assumes, as do those commentators, that bad conduct will be 
deterred if targeted with appropriate regulatory penalties, 
whether ex ante or ex post.  In the context of my talk, however, 
regulators do not and (I show) cannot know all the conduct that 
leads to financial failures.  Moreover, factors other than conduct 
can lead to financial failures.2 
Framing the ex ante/ex post distinction around conduct 
would thus be misleading.  I therefore frame the distinction 
around the impact of the regulation (again, ex ante regulation 
focuses on preventing financial failures, ex post regulation 
focuses on mitigating the harm from financial failures). 
INTRODUCTION 
Ideal financial regulation would work ex ante, to prevent 
financial failures.  Once a failure occurs, there may already be 
economic damage, and it may be difficult to stop the failure from 
spreading and becoming systemic. 
The reality, though, is that preventing financial failures 
should be only one role for regulators.  Even an optimal 
prophylactic regulatory regime cannot anticipate and prevent 
every failure.  For example, financial panics are often the failures 
 
 1 The choice of ex ante versus ex post regulatory penalties will depend on such 
factors as the policing capacity of ex ante penalties, the cost of consequences resulting 
from the conduct compared with the cost of preventing the conduct, and the ability to 
know what conduct leads to bad consequences. See, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS 
OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 87–91, 428–30, 479–82, 492–520, 572–78 (2004); 
Christopher Boerner & Barak D. Richman, A Transaction Cost Economizing Approach to 
Regulation: Understanding the NIMBY Problem and Improving Regulatory Responses, 23 
YALE J. ON REG. 29, 58–66 (2006) (offering a way to compare alternative regulatory 
regimes). 
 2 And, regulation that helps mitigate the consequences of financial failures, such as 
creating financial safety nets, might even perversely affect conduct, fostering moral 
hazard in parties that believe they are too big to fail. See infra Part II.A. 
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that trigger systemic collapse.3  But regulation aimed at 
preventing financial panics cannot anticipate all the causes of the 
panics.4  And even when identified, panics cannot always be 
averted easily because investors are not always rational.5 
One might also argue that some failures could be avoided by 
reducing leverage in the financial system.  Reducing leverage 
reduces the risk that a financial institution will default and also 
reduces the likelihood that a default at one financial institution 
will cause defaults at other institutions.6  But regulation limiting 
leverage could create significant costs.  Some leverage is good, 
enabling a firm to operate efficiently and grow; and there is no 
optimal across-the-board leverage ratio that is right for every 
financial firm.7 
Analysis of financial failures underlying the recent global 
recession further indicates that ex ante regulation cannot 
anticipate and prevent every failure.  These failures can be 
attributed conceptually to at least four market imperfections: 
(1) conflicts of interest; (2) complacency of investors and other 
market participants; (3) complexity of financial markets and of 
the securities traded therein; and (4) “a type of tragedy of the 
commons” in which “the benefits of exploiting finite capital 
resources accrue to individual market participants,” each of 
whom is motivated to maximize use of the resource, whereas the 
costs of exploitation are distributed more widely.8  Government 
can probably manage conflicts, and it can also reduce the tragedy 
of the commons (such as by creating a systemic risk fund to 
which systemically important firms are required to contribute, 
thereby internalizing costs and motivating a degree of self-
monitoring by those firms—both individually and collectively—
against externalities).9 
 
 3 Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 214 (2008) [hereinafter 
Schwarcz, Systemic Risk]. 
 4 Id. at 216. 
 5 Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk: Towards an 
Analytical Framework, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 38), 
available at http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2924&context= 
faculty_scholarship. 
 6 Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 3, at 223. 
 7 Id. at 224. 
 8 Steven L. Schwarcz, Understanding the Subprime Financial Crisis, 60 S.C. L. 
REV. 549, 561–62 (2009) (quoting Steven L. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets: 
Lessons from the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown, 93 MINN. L. REV. 373, 406 (2008)). 
 9 This approach was originally in the Dodd-Frank Act, but it was taken out at the 
last minute because of opposition by politicians who believed (in my opinion, wrongly) 
that it would increase moral hazard by institutionalizing bailouts.  A privately-funded 
systemic risk fund not only can mitigate systemic externalities, but also can help 
minimize the potential for risky behavior caused by institutions that believe they are too 
big to fail.  The too-big-to-fail problem is effectively an externality imposed on government 
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But government cannot fully manage problems of increasing 
complexity, which makes disclosure an inadequate means of 
reducing information asymmetry.10  Furthermore, complex 
financial markets innovate more quickly than regulators can 
adapt.  Nor can government fully manage problems of 
complacency; human nature is hard to change, and investors and 
other market participants do not (even absent a panic) always 
rationally evaluate risk. 
Complete ex ante financial regulation, whereby regulators 
prevent every failure, is thus a futile goal.  And even if it were 
feasible, it would not necessarily be desirable.  Ex ante 
regulation can provide an incentive for regulatory arbitrage.11  
Furthermore, any ex ante regulation that attempts to prevent all 
financial failures may end up being too chilling, thereby 
dampening economic growth.12  Ex post remedies will therefore 
always be needed to try to prevent financial failures—when they 
inevitably occur—from spreading and becoming systemic. 
Chaos theory supports this type of reactive approach.  In 
complex engineering systems, failures are inevitable.13  
Therefore, it is important to try to break the transmission of 
these failures14 and to limit their systemic consequences. 
I first will discuss how to break the transmission of financial 
failures and thereafter will examine how to limit their systemic 
consequences.  In my analysis, I stand partly on the shoulders of 
 
(and ultimately taxpayers) by an institution engaging in such risky behavior.  A privately-
funded systemic risk fund would help to internalize that externality.  Furthermore, the 
ability of government to require additional contributions to this type of fund should 
motivate contributors to the fund to monitor each other to reduce the potential for such 
risky behavior.  The IMF appears to be using the European Commission’s recent proposal 
to tax the financial sector as a platform to announce that new taxes on banks [are] needed 
to provide an insurance fund for future financial meltdowns and to curb excessive risk-
taking. 
 10 See Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 5, (manuscript at 40–41).  Cf. Kathryn 
Judge, Fragmentation Nodes: A Study in Financial Innovation, Complexity and Systemic 
Risk 82 (Dec. 14, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (explaining why 
market observers and regulators failed to observe the “most pernicious forms of 
complexity” leading to the recent financial collapse). 
 11 See, e.g., Samuel W. Buell, Good Faith and Law Evasion, 58 UCLA L. REV. 
(forthcoming Feb. 2011) (manuscript at 7–10) (on file with the Duke University School of 
Law Scholarship Repository), available at http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/ 
viewcontent.cgi?article=2943&context=faculty_scholarship. 
 12 Lawrence G. Baxter, Adaptive Regulation in the Amoral Bazaar 11 (Duke Law 
Working Papers, Paper No. 53, 2010), available at http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/ 
viewcontent.cgi?article=2969&context=faculty_scholarship. 
 13 Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 211, 248 (2009). 
 14 As to breaking transmission of failures, see Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 5, 
(manuscript at 4). 
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Professor Iman Anabtawi of UCLA Law School, with whom I 
have written about and discussed many of these issues.15 
I.  BREAKING THE TRANSMISSION OF FINANCIAL FAILURES 
A. Breaking Transmission Chains 
Professor Anabtawi and I have recently examined how 
regulators can identify and try to break the transmission chains 
of financial failures.16  Localized financial failures, by 
themselves, are unlikely to produce systemic effects; but when 
these failures are transmitted through financial institutions and 
markets, even relatively small failures can have systemic 
consequences. 
We posit that two otherwise independent correlations can 
combine to transmit localized financial failures into broader 
systemic crises.  The first is a correlation between a financial 
institution’s financial condition and its exposure to risk from 
failures consisting of low-probability adverse events.  The second 
is a correlation across financial institutions and markets.  Using 
four financial crises within the past century, we illustrate that 
these two correlations have at times combined historically to 
potentiate the systemic transmission of localized financial 
failures. 
Prior to the global recession, for example, subprime 
mortgage loans were bundled together as collateral to partially 
support the payment of complex mortgage-backed securities, 
which were purchased by banks and other financial institutions 
worldwide.  These securities maintained their value so long as 
home prices appreciated, as they had been doing for decades and 
as market observers assumed would continue. 
When home prices began falling, some of these mortgage-
backed securities began defaulting, requiring financial 
institutions heavily invested in the securities to write down their 
value, in turn causing these institutions to appear, if not be, 
financially risky.  This reflected a correlation between low 
probability risk of failure—that home prices would significantly 
fall and cause defaults—and an institution’s financial condition.  
The global recession also entailed a correlation across financial 
institutions and markets—not only a tight interconnectedness 
among banks and non-bank financial institutions, but also a 
 
 15 See id. at (manuscript at 1). 
 16 See id. at (manuscript at 62) (arguing that “one focus of optimal regulation should 
be on attempting to weaken correlations within the financial system that serve to 
transmit systemic risk”). 
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tight interconnectedness between financial institutions and 
markets.  These correlations combined to facilitate the 
transmission of localized financial failures into a systemic 
collapse. 
Professor Anabtawi and I recognize the limitations of our 
approach: one cannot always anticipate all transmission chains 
of financial failures;17 and, even after a transmission chain is 
identified, regulation cannot always break it.  We therefore 
caution that our approach should be only one focus of optimal 
regulation. 
B. Market Circuit Breakers 
Another approach to breaking the transmission of financial 
failures, at least in the context of securities markets, is to install 
market “circuit breakers.”  Although increased speed in data 
transmission is generally associated with market efficiency, the 
extreme speeds at which algorithmic trading takes place creates 
a danger that trading in highly automated financial markets will 
sometimes cause pricing failures. 
Last May, for example, the Dow Jones Industrial Average 
plunged nearly 1000 points in twenty minutes, a pricing failure 
precipitated by a trader executing an algorithm to sell 
approximately $4.1 billion worth of derivatives contracts without 
regard to time or price.  In response, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) adopted a universal circuit breaker rule to 
halt trading of an individual security across all exchanges for five 
minutes if its price moves up or down ten percent or more within 
a five-minute period.  Assuming a security’s price has been 
pushed below its intrinsic value, a pause should give traders 
enough time to recognize the disparity and to respond if they 
believe the security is mispriced. 
Although the adoption of a universal circuit breaker rule is 
intended to increase stability, that rule—like any other risk-
management strategy—will be ineffective to the extent it can be 
eluded by mistake or design.  For example, if traders mistakenly 
believe that a trading halt is based on fundamental valuation 
issues, the halt could aggravate problems.  Market circuit 
breakers are thus not panaceas, even in the limited securities-
market context in which they operate. 
 
 17 Professor Anabtawi and I recognize, for example, that additional financial crises 
have occurred over the past century and longer, and that a complete study of all such 
crises might indicate additional correlations within the financial system. 
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II.  LIMITING SYSTEMIC CONSEQUENCES 
The systemic consequences of financial failures also can be 
limited.  Perhaps the most important way to accomplish this is 
through financial safety nets. 
A. Financial Safety Nets 
There are at least three categories of safety nets for financial 
failures: (1) safety nets for debt defaults by banks and other 
financial institutions; (2) safety nets for pricing failures in 
financial markets (focusing here on stabilizing price collapses 
rather than preventing them ab initio through market circuit 
breakers); and (3) safety nets for sovereign nation debt defaults.  
These categories reflect that financial institution failure, 
financial market failure, and sovereign debt failure could have 
systemic consequences. 
i.  Financial Safety Nets for Banks and Other Financial 
Institutions 
Financial safety nets can help protect troubled banks and 
other financial institutions from default and eventual collapse.  
In response to bank runs in the Great Depression, the U.S. 
Congress enacted section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act, 
empowering the Federal Reserve System (Fed) to act as a lender 
of last resort in “unusual and exigent circumstances” to banks 
and other financial institutions.  Central banks of other nations 
have similar missions.18 
The primary concern with these types of safety nets is that 
anticipation of a bailout will encourage financial institutions to 
engage in morally hazardous (i.e., fiscally reckless) behavior.  
Constructive ambiguity—bailing out some institutions but not 
others, to reduce reliance on bailouts—can mitigate moral 
hazard; but it can also lead to potential mistakes, such as not 
bailing out Lehman Brothers. 
 
 18 Although the mission of the European Central Bank (ECB) is to stabilize the price 
of the European currency, in “exceptional circumstances” the ECB may indemnify 
national central banks for “specific losses arising from monetary policy operations” taken 
for the benefit of the central banking system. Protocol on the Statute of the European 
System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank art. 32.4, Dec. 16, 2004, 2004 
O.J. (C 310) 225, 239.  See also Duncan Alford, The Lamfalussy Process and EU Bank 
Regulation: Another Step on the Road to Pan-European Regulation?, 25 ANN. REV. 
BANKING & FIN. L. 389, 392 (2006) (“National governments or related agencies, such as 
central banks, typically have lender-of-last-resort responsibility for banks operating 
within their borders.”);; Steve H. Hanke, Currency Boards, 579 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & 
SOC. SCI. 87, 90 tbl. 2 (2002) (observing that a typical central bank functions, among other 
things, as a lender of last resort). 
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Although the tension between financial safety nets and 
moral hazard may well be unavoidable, the likelihood that 
financial institutions will engage in morally hazardous behavior 
may be overestimated.  Financial institutions can be liquidated, 
so an institution that engages in morally hazardous behavior is 
playing a very dangerous game.  Indeed, there is no solid 
evidence, even in the global recession, that financial institutions 
have been engaging in that type of behavior. 
Lack of evidence aside, because the Fed used section 13(3) to 
bail out huge financial institutions, like AIG, through (at least 
initial) taxpayer expense, politicians reacted in the Dodd-Frank 
Act by limiting that safety net.19  I have serious doubts whether 
legislative pre-set limits on a financial safety net should ever 
replace the judgment of a government agency—especially one as 
independent as the Fed—to decide, in actual context, whether to 
extend the safety net.20 
ii.  Financial Safety Nets for Markets 
We need to more seriously consider extending safety-net 
mechanisms to financial markets, qua markets.  The global 
recession has demonstrated that panic-driven market pricing 
failures—exacerbated by such factors as marking-to-market and 
concerns over counterparty-risk—can have systemic 
consequences.  Experience in that recession supports 
establishment of market liquidity providers of last resort to 
stabilize market prices. 
For example, in response to the collapse of the commercial 
paper market, the Fed created the Commercial Paper Funding 
Facility (CPFF) to act as a lender of last resort for that market, 
with the goal of addressing “temporary liquidity distortions” by 
purchasing commercial paper from highly rated issuers that 
could not otherwise sell their paper.  The CPFF apparently 
helped to stabilize the commercial paper market, without 
fostering moral hazard.21 
Highly publicized recent governmental purchases of market 
securities only indirectly constitute safety-net mechanisms for 
 
 19 The Dodd-Frank Act limits, among other things, bailouts of individual financial 
institutions. 
 20 Cf. DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL 136–37 (2011) (arguing that the 
“incentives created by [the Dodd-Frank Act’s limitations on the section 13(3) safety-net] 
are not encouraging”). 
 21 Tobias Adrian, Karin Kimbrough & Dina Marchioni, The Federal Reserve’s 
Commercial Paper Funding Facility, FED. RES. BANK N.Y. ECON. POL’Y REV. (forthcoming 
2011) (manuscript at 10–12).  See also Steven L. Schwarcz, Too Big to Fail?: Recasting the 
Financial Safety Net, in THE PANIC OF 2008, at 94, 100 (Lawrence E. Mitchell & Arthur E. 
Wilmarth, Jr. eds., 2010) [hereinafter Schwarcz, Too Big to Fail?]. 
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financial markets.  For example, European Central Bank 
purchases of Greek, Irish, and Portuguese bonds22 are intended 
to stabilize those nations, not the sovereign bond markets per se; 
and the Fed’s purchases of U.S. Treasury securities (so-called 
“quantitative easing”) are intended to stimulate the economy, not 
the market for U.S. Treasuries per se.  We need to more seriously 
consider how safety-net mechanisms for financial markets, qua 
markets, can control panic-driven pricing failures that can lead to 
systemic collapses.23 
iii.  Financial Safety Nets for Sovereign Nations 
Even a default by relatively small nations, like Greece, 
Ireland, and Portugal, can have global repercussions.  Financial 
safety nets therefore should be considered for sovereign nation 
debt. 
Traditionally, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
provides this safety net.  But the IMF safety net raises various 
concerns, including: (1) the potential for moral hazard; (2) the 
inefficient use of IMF-member-nation (and thus ultimately 
taxpayer) funds24; and (3) the possibility of imposing politically 
motivated, sometimes harmful, “conditionality” on nations that 
otherwise would benefit from the safety net. 
The IMF safety net could also be viewed as insufficient or 
even unreliable when a sovereign debt default is likely to cause 
disproportionately greater regional than international harm.  For 
this reason, observers are increasingly focusing on the possibility 
of establishing regional safety nets for sovereign nations.  In 
December 2010, for example, I participated in a high-level 
meeting in Oxford to examine how to create a regional safety net 
for Euro-zone nations.25  And not too dissimilarly, there has been 
increasing concern that some states in the United States, which 
have many sovereign attributes, may need financial protection 
from default. 
Conceptually, regional safety nets should be no different 
from global safety nets, except insofar as who provides the 
 
 22 See infra note 25. 
 23 For initial analysis of safety-net mechanisms for financial markets, see generally 
Schwarcz, Too Big to Fail?, supra note 21, and Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 5, 
(manuscript at 55–58). 
 24 See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Bankruptcy 
Reorganization Approach, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 956, 963–66 (2000) [hereinafter Schwarcz, 
Sovereign Debt Restructuring] (demonstrating the cost to taxpayers of IMF member-
nation contributions). 
 25 To some extent, regional safety nets are being spun on an ad hoc basis for 
sovereign-nation debt, such as through European Central Bank purchases of Greek, Irish, 
and Portuguese bonds.  But that is in a highly politically visible and debt-specific context. 
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funding.26  For a regional safety net, the funders are—like the 
recent European Union response to the debt problems of Greece, 
Ireland, and Portugal—primarily regional confederations and 
their member nations. 
A conceptual analysis of financial safety nets for sovereign 
nation debt therefore need not focus, at least in the first instance, 
on whether the safety net should be regional or international.  
The fundamental problems are the same for both. 
The main problem is that a nation that anticipates being 
bailed out is likely to engage in morally hazardous behavior.  
Nations are much more likely than financial institutions to 
engage in this behavior because nations, unlike firms, cannot be 
liquidated, and also because governments have strong political 
incentives (sometimes augmented by popular uprisings, such as 
the riots in Athens) to avoid reducing services or raising taxes.27  
Another problem with financial safety nets for nations is that 
bailouts are terribly expensive—in the case of Greece, for 
example, costing potentially hundreds of billions of euros. 
These are growing problems: as global capital markets 
increasingly (and inevitably) embrace sovereign bonds as a 
financing tool, a country’s debt becomes more tightly linked to 
the rest of the financial system, making a default more likely to 
trigger a systemic collapse. 
The alternative to a bailout is an orderly debt restructuring, 
but that is usually impractical for nations because of two market 
imperfections: a holdout problem and a funding problem.28  The 
holdout problem is that any given creditor has an incentive to 
strategically hold out from agreeing to a reasonable debt-
restructuring plan, hoping that the imperative of others to settle 
will persuade them to allocate the holdout more than its fair 
share of the settlement or purchase the holdout’s claim. 
The funding problem is that a country is likely to need to 
borrow new money to pay critical expenses during the debt 
 
 26 At a December 8, 2010 meeting at the University of Oxford, Dr. Domenico 
Lombardi, President of The Oxford Institute for Economic Policy, discussed favorably a 
proposal by Daniel Gros and Thomas Mayer for a European monetary fund. See Daniel 
Gros & Thomas Mayer, How to Deal with Sovereign Default in Europe: Create the 
European Monetary Fund Now!, CENTRE FOR EUR. POL’Y STUD., POL’Y BRIEF, May 17, 
2010, at 1, 2.  I argued that proposal is nothing more than what scholars have proposed 
for years in a broader context. 
 27 The Greek government, for example, did little to impose fiscal austerity even as 
debts accumulated. 
 28 See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Facing the Debt Challenge of Countries That 
Are Too Big to Fail, in SOVEREIGN DEBT: FROM SAFETY TO DEFAULT (Robert W. Kolb ed.) 
(forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 2–3), available at http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/ 
viewcontent.cgi?article=2950&context=faculty_scholarship. 
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restructuring process, but no lender is likely to be willing to lend 
such funds unless its right to repayment has priority over 
existing debt claims. 
Any effective solution to the sovereign debt dilemma would 
have to address both the holdout problem and the funding 
problem.  Given the importance and high media visibility of 
country debt problems, let me digress a few minutes to examine 
how these problems could be addressed. 
Addressing the Holdout Problem.  The holdout problem can 
be addressed by legislating, through international treaty, a form 
of “super-majority” voting on sovereign debt-restructuring plans, 
in which a vote by the overwhelming majority of similarly 
situated creditors can bind dissenting creditors.29  This is the 
tried-and-true method by which insolvency law, including 
Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, successfully and 
equitably addresses the holdout problem in a corporate context 
and achieves consensual debt restructuring.  Because only 
similarly situated creditors can vote to bind dissenting creditors, 
and because any outcome of voting will bind all those creditors 
alike, the outcomes of votes should benefit the claims of holdouts 
and dissenters as much as the claims of the super-majority. 
The IMF actually proposed, some years back, a sovereign 
debt restructuring mechanism (SDRM) similar to this, based on 
scholarly research of the problem (including my own research).30  
It was never adopted, however, because of political opposition in 
the United States by officials in the second Bush Administration, 
apparently based on philosophical dogma that free-market 
solutions always ought to trump legislative ones.  They instead 
favored solving the holdout problem contractually, through what 
are referred to as collective-action clauses, allowing essential 
payment terms of a loan facility to be changed through super-
majority, as opposed to unanimous, voting. 
There are, however, two fundamental problems with 
collective-action clauses.  First, collective-action clauses are not 
always included in sovereign loan and bond agreements.  In the 
Greek debt crisis, for example, ninety percent of the total debt 
was not governed by collective-action clauses.  Second, even if 
every sovereign loan and bond agreement included collective-
action clauses, those clauses only work on an agreement-by-
agreement basis.  Therefore, any one or more syndicate(s) of 
banks or group of bondholders that fails to achieve a super-
 
 29 Id. at (manuscript at 3). 
 30 Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring, supra note 24, at 956–57. 
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majority vote would itself be a holdout vis-à-vis other creditors.  
It thus is unlikely that collective-action clauses can ever 
effectively resolve the holdout problem in sovereign-debt 
restructuring.31 
I therefore believe that an international convention, in which 
super-majority voting can bind all of a debtor-nation’s creditors, 
is needed to solve the holdout problem. 
Addressing the Funding Problem.  Such a convention could 
also address the funding problem.  A simple remedy would be to 
grant a first priority right of repayment to loans of new money 
made to enable a country to pay critical expenses during the debt 
restructuring process.  Existing creditors can be protected by 
giving them the right to object to a new-money loan if its amount 
is too high or its terms—including conditionality deemed 
appropriate by the lenders—are inappropriate.  (Conditionality 
will therefore be negotiated.)  Existing creditors will also be 
further protected because a country that abuses new-money 
lending privileges will be unlikely to receive super-majority 
creditor approval for a debt-restructuring plan. 
B. Resolution Mechanisms 
Another way to limit the systemic consequences of financial 
failures is through resolution mechanisms that diminish the 
impact of the failure.  An example of such a resolution 
mechanism would be a pre-set plan to liquidate an entity or re-
arrange its capital structure upon the occurrence of stated 
events, like insolvency. 
Resolution mechanisms are most applicable to financial 
institutions.  They have no direct application to markets.  And 
they have relatively little application to sovereign nations, 
because sovereign nations cannot politically—and arguably 
should not morally—be liquidated. 
Resolution mechanisms have long been used for non-
financial institutions.  In that context, these mechanisms are 
usually called ‘bankruptcy’ or ‘insolvency’ laws, and they 
generally provide legal guidelines for liquidating companies or 
enabling companies to reorganize when, at least in theory, 
reorganization would be more efficient than liquidation.  
(Although I have long argued for a “bankruptcy reorganization” 
approach to sovereign debt restructuring,32 I described the core of 
 
 31 Id. at 960–61. 
 32 See supra notes 24 and 28. 
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that approach when discussing financial safety nets for sovereign 
nations). 
There is controversy, though, whether bankruptcy-type 
resolution mechanisms are appropriate for financial institutions, 
especially when such institutions (like Lehman Brothers) are 
multinational.  This controversy is not surprising; even in the 
context of domestic bankruptcy for non-financial firms, there is 
controversy over what should be the fundamental goals.33 
There are also unanswered questions about incentives to 
implement bankruptcy-type resolution of financial institutions, 
especially when the sole resolution option—as under the Dodd-
Frank Act—is liquidation.  Will regulators, politically, be 
prepared to pull the trigger?  If they do, could that cause larger 
systemic consequences, as did Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy?34 
CONCLUSION 
Ex ante financial regulation is inherently limited.  
Regulation cannot anticipate or control every source of financial 
failure.  Ex post regulation is therefore needed to help break the 
transmission of financial failures and to limit their systemic 
consequences. 
My goal today has not been to identify and critique all 
possible ex post financial regulatory approaches.  Nor has it been 
to systematically compare ex ante and ex post regulatory 
approaches.35  Rather, I have attempted to contrast fundamental 
differences between the two, as well as to illustrate how ex post 
approaches can—and arguably should—supplement ex ante 
approaches as part of a comprehensive financial regulatory 
framework.36 
 
  
 
 
 33 See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy’s Uncontested Axioms, 108 YALE L.J. 573, 
576–77 (1998). 
 34 Cf. Judge, supra note 10, at 83 (explaining why determining when to intervene 
can be a “real challenge” for regulators). 
 35 Cf. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 3, at 214–34 (identifying and comparing 
potential ex ante preventative and ex post reactive approaches to regulating systemic 
risk). 
 36 Cf. John Armour, Bank Resolution Regimes: Designing the Right Model? (Aug. 3, 
2010) (unpublished working paper) (on file with author) (“Resolution mechanisms must be 
seen as just one part of a larger regulatory toolkit, which contains a mix of ex ante 
measures as well as ex post resolution tools.”). 
